CRIME OR WAR: CYBERSPACE LAW AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE
Our Nation's growing dependence on cyber and information-related technologies, coupled with an increasing threat of malicious cyber-attacks and loss of privacy, has given rise to the need for greater security of our digital networks and infrastructures. In the Information Age, the very technologies that empower us to create and build also empower those who would disrupt and destroy. President Obama directed a 60-day review of cyber-security strategy which resulted in a policy review document. 3 Both documents recognized that cyberspace was a new domain in national security with complex legal issues and network vulnerabilities, especially in the nation's critical infrastructure. 4 Since cyberspace is relatively new, existing international law does not directly distinguish between crimes and acts of war for activities in cyberspace. However, making the distinction between crime and war is essential in determining which of the multiple stakeholders takes the lead in preventing or responding to computer intrusions on United States (US) government or private networks.
Part of the challenge in making legal distinctions is defining the evolving terminology related to cyberspace. This paper uses the definitions accepted in joint doctrine with some minor modifications. Computer intrusions are -incident[s] of unauthorized access to data or an automated information system‖ 5 or networks by state and non-state actors. Computer intrusions take two forms: computer network exploitation and computer network attack. Computer network exploitation (CNE) is -enabling operations and intelligence collection capabilities conducted through the use of computer networks to gather data from target or adversary automated information systems or networks.‖ 6 Computer network attacks (CNA) are -actions taken through the use of computer networks to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves.‖ 7 While CNE and CNA tools are similar, CNE is usually done with the intent for espionage, while CNA is done for profit, sabotage, or other harm. 8 According to General Keith Alexander, commander of US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), - [t] here is a real probability, that in the future, this country will get hit with a destructive [cyber] attack, and we need to be ready for it.‖ 9 Imagine the following scenario as an example of such an attack. It is 2012 and the United States has just fallen victim to a cyber-worm designed to precisely target the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems of nuclear power facilities and cause physical harm by shutting down reactor cooling systems. The worm infected 20 nuclear facilities, with two of the facilities experiencing temporary cooling system failures, resulting in 15 deaths and 80 injuries before the damage could be contained. Attribution has been elusive, with the worms being traced back to computers in the United States, India, and
Pakistan, but intelligence officials suspect Iran of being behind the worm as retaliation for a 2010 CNA against Iranian nuclear facility centrifuges.
A post-attack intelligence review by the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI) revealed several data points that were never shared nor connected.
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimated Iran had intent but insufficient capability for CNA. The National Security Agency (NSA) conducted network analysis that showed contacts between Iranian intelligence officials and a Russian hacker website also associated with terrorist and criminal groups. The Department of State (DoS) had a human intelligence (HUMINT) report of a highly skilled Russian hacker traveling to Iran two weeks prior to the attack. At this point in time, USCYBERCOM and the federal government remain unclear on how to respond since attribution and the legal status of the attack, whether it was a criminal act or an act of war, remain unclear.
This paper examines the law concerning cyberspace and analyzes six basic sources of cyberspace threats in order to propose which threats and their resulting computer intrusions are criminal as opposed to acts of war. It then describes the implications for intelligence collection and analysis that result from this legal and threat environment in order to propose several imperatives for the intelligence community that could help prevent scenarios like the one described above.
Existing Law and Stakeholders Regarding Cyberspace Activities
There are differing opinions on the applicability of current international law to cyberspace. Some scholars and lawyers argue that there are -no common, codified, legal standards regarding cyber aggression‖ and -current international law is not well Additionally, the United States has indicted criminals for using, maintaining, and selling botnets, which are networks of robotic internet devices that control other computers without the user's knowledge. 35 The use of botnets can be prosecuted as civil trespass but the plaintiff must establish damages as well as trespass in cyberspace. 36 There are also copyright laws protecting companies from cyber-theft. The Digital Millennium
Copyright Act protects companies that encrypt trade secrets from hackers who would try to circumvent the company's encryption or digital locks. because there were no Israeli laws recognizing this as a crime. 40 In 2000, a Filipino hacker was not prosecuted for his -I Love You‖ virus, which infected over 60 million computers worldwide, again because there were no laws against this cyberspace activity in the Philippines. 41 There has been some recent international progress in trying to address these difficulties in accountability for cyber-crimes. 
Sources of Threats and Their Status Under Law
Having examined the law on cyberspace and key stakeholders, this paper will now describe the basic threats in cyberspace and their general status under the law.
There are six basic sources of threats: foreign nations, criminal groups, hackers, hacktivists, disgruntled insiders, and terrorists. 51 Foreign nations would appear to have the most robust cyberspace means and capabilities at this time. It is estimated that -over 120 countries already have or are developing computer attack capabilities." 52 Most of these countries are focused on CNE or using cyberspace tools as part of their intelligence and espionage activities. 53 According to the ODNI, the majority of computer intrusions originate in Russia and China, and both nations have large efforts focused on CNE and CNA.
54
The CNE activities of foreign nations fall into the criminal category under existing law and are more common than CNA. CNA by foreign nations is generally accepted as the most dangerous threat to US computer networks. 55 As previously discussed, CNA could rise to the level of an armed attack based on scope, duration, and intensity.
Essentially, a CNA that causes physical damage could equate to an armed attack. The primary difficulty, however, is attributing that armed attack back to a foreign nation. Attribution of a CNA to a foreign government is complicated because it is difficult to trace the connection between an individual hacker and a government. Furthermore, some nations may attempt to use an IP address that attributes the CNA to another nation or individual (i.e., they engage in false flag operations). 63 Criminal groups, by the nature of their intent, fall into the category of cyber-crime.
These groups conduct computer intrusions for profit, and cyber-crime will continue to expand as long as it remains lucrative. 64 Criminal groups target personally identifiable information (PII) on individuals and proprietary information from private companies in order to gain unauthorized access to credit and bank accounts, run scams, or sell information to the highest bidder. In some cases, these groups seize SCADA controls for extortion, forcing the private company to pay a fee to regain control of important functions. 65 Criminal groups also market and sell the tools for crime like botnets, spiders, and zombie computers.
66
Hackers comprise a wide category of individuals who often conduct CNE and CNA for thrills or bragging rights. 67 In the past, hackers required exceptional skill, but Third, any organization that will conduct CNA will require legal expertise on the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC) to understand how the principles of military necessity, unnecessary suffering, proportionality and discrimination of military targets from civilian sites apply in cyberspace. 87 In the opening scenario, USCYBERCOM would require a legal determination of an armed attack based on attribution and intent in order to respond. The appropriate response would be tested against the LOAC.
The second imperative is that intelligence must clearly quantify threat capabilities, intent, and vulnerabilities to facilitate the decisions of key stakeholders.
One of the mission objectives of the US National Intelligence Strategy (NIS) is to -enhance cybersecurity.- 88 The NIS further emphasizes that one of the ways the intelligence community does this is -by expanding our knowledge of the capabilities, intentions, and cyber vulnerabilities of our adversaries.‖ In deciding how to respond to a computer intrusion, intelligence can provide decision makers with a better understanding of the threat's intent and vulnerability.
Understanding the threat's intent (i.e. CNE versus CNA) makes a difference in the US response. If the United States decides to respond in kind, understanding the adversary's cyberspace vulnerability becomes important. A comprehensive CNA on US infrastructure would require extensive planning and preparation. 90 This amount of preparation, surveillance, and testing is vulnerable to detection if intelligence is sufficiently focused and persistent in determining capabilities and intent.
As previously stated, determining attribution is very difficult. However, attribution is precisely what decision makers need from intelligence for both prevention and response. The NIS emphasizes that the intelligence community further enhances cybersecurity -by increasing our ability to detect and attribute adversary cyber activities.‖ This problem of attribution contributes to the third intelligence imperative, which is that network analysis is important in order to determine the true source of the threat.
While certain members of the intelligence community have made great progress in using network analysis methods, progress is sporadic across the community as a whole. 92 The intelligence community, whether associated with military or law enforcement organizations, should be investing in data mining and link analysis technologies and training. Data mining is generally used to determine anomalies while link analysis finds commonalities. 93 These network analysis technologies can exploit large amounts of data and have proven to be powerful tools in determining affiliations and linkages while also highlighting the absence of linkages. For example, scientists at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology conducted an experiment in which they were able -to use network analysis to determine the sexual orientation of Facebook users even though these users had not disclosed their preferences publicly.‖ share technology and expertise for reasons more related to profit and gaining operational capability than ideological similarities. 96 Analysts can monitor hacker and terrorist chat rooms and web sites to determine linkages between the two and their potential sharing of technology and expertise. 97 The fourth intelligence imperative is that an all-source approach is necessary. This is directly tied into the problem of attribution and network analysis. Because cyberspace resides in the signals intelligence (SIGINT) discipline, it would be very easy to look at this solely as a SIGINT problem. However, telephony and computers do not have all the answers. Individuals with expertise in computer intrusions also generally have expertise conducting those intrusions in a way that electronically attributes the intrusions to another individual's computer using botnets. Thus, it would be very easy to make a false attribution using single-source SIGINT. Bringing other intelligence disciplines into the analysis should help capture such inconsistencies, as well as possibly show linkages not seen through SIGINT. In fact, the NIS specifically emphasizes the need to integrate CI with cyberspace to protect critical infrastructure. of this progress is in the area of defining cyber-crime rather than cyber-war. Given US interests in protecting privacy rights, the issues related to attribution will also endure.
However, stakeholders require timely and accurate intelligence in order to make decisions on the legal status of a computer intrusion and its source as well as the appropriate response, whether criminal prosecution or military action. 30 Todd, -Armed Attack in Cyberspace,‖ 94. According to Todd, -while a criminal offense in virtually every nation state, espionage is not a violation of the law of war and was first recognized in the Lieber Code in 1863.‖ 31 Attribution for cyberspace intrusions is historically very difficult. You can often attribute the attacks to certain computers based on their internet protocol (IP) addresses but these computers are often infected by robot networks directing the intrusions from other remote computers. This makes clear attribution to a responsible individual difficult. If you get that far, then proving the individual was operating in an official capacity as a representative of a foreign nation is an additional level of difficulty. The problems in attribution make deterrence by punishment challenging although deterrence through denial remains possible. For more information on the difficulty with attribution see Ashley, Anatomy of Cyber Terrorism, 25-26; and Beidleman, Defining and Deterring Cyber War, 3. For a detailed discussion of the difficulty with attribution and its effect on deterrence, see Libicki, Cyberdetterence and Cyberwar. 32 Wingfield, Law of Information Conflict, 8. According to Wingfield, -[even though] a nonstate actor can cause identical damage to a state's information infrastructure as can a state actor, a hostile, transnational activity in cyberspace committed by a non-state actor remains a law enforcement issue. The issue of state and non-state sponsorship, however, may be very factually complicated by a number of circumstances such as the activities of state-owned commercial enterprises and surrogate-actors, as well as the anonymity afforded by technology. Nevertheless, the legal analysis remains rather straightforward. Determining when state-owned commercial enterprises, for example, are acting as a commercial enterprise or at the direction of a state is a determination surrounding facts such as who controls the enterprise, who directed the activity, and the nature of the activity. It is not an issue of law. Consequently, from a legal perspective, all hostile transnational activities in cyberspace are either non-state-sponsored and thus a crime addressed by national and peacetime treaty law, or they are state-sponsored and thus a use of force governed by the law of conflict management and the law of armed conflict. The complete refusal or unwillingness of a state, however, to cooperate in the suppression or prevention of an acknowledged non-state-sponsored hostile, transnational activity in cyberspace that originates in its sovereign territory constitutes state-sponsorship of a use of force ipso facto, thereby invoking the law of conflict management which may authorize a use of force in selfdefense against such a state or the non-state actors in that state. In the absence of any statesponsorship of terrorist or criminal activities, a use of force by a state against those non-state actors in the sovereign territory of another state without that state's consent may rise to the level to be an unlawful use of force against that territorial state.‖
